In the dark winter months of 1973-1974, the Conservative Prime Minister, Edward Heath, told a private audience of the grave implications of the soaring price of oil. ‘The assumption that had underlain the last 25 years,’ he said, ‘that the growth of the developed countries could proceed steadily on the basis of cheap energy, had been shattered almost overnight.’ Its loss, he warned, ‘would breed social instability, and the risk of radical and even violent change.’

The actions of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to quadruple the price of oil between October 1973 and February 1974 had delivered an almighty shock to the industrialised world. The events of that winter have often been pinpointed as the rupture that marked the decisive end to a golden age of stunning economic growth and rising prosperity.

The energy crisis that ensued seemingly confirmed beyond doubt that the age of postwar affluence had come to a shuddering halt. ‘The history of the twenty years after 1973’, Eric Hobsbawm wrote in the Age of Extremes, ‘is that of a world which lost its bearings and slid into instability and crisis’.

Traditional assumptions unravelled as stagflation ripped through the economies of the industrialised world and beyond. Although by no means the sole cause of the economic turbulence, the implications of the oil crisis were profound. In the words of one of the leading historians of OPEC: ‘It shook the transatlantic, white, liberal, Keynesian civilization that had emerged from WWII to its core.’

In Britain, the immediate fallout of the energy crisis saw the fall of Heath’s Conservative Government. Amid the OPEC shock and the Government’s confrontation with the National Union of Mineworkers, Heath had decided to call an early General Election for 28 February 1974. The gamble failed as he was narrowly defeated by Harold Wilson’s Labour.

Significantly, the 1974 election witnessed the remarkable rise of the Scottish National Party (SNP). Claiming Britain’s mounting North Sea oil discoveries for an independent Scotland, the SNP won 22 per cent of the popular vote in February and elected seven MPs. In a second General Election that October, the Nationalists won 30 per cent, displacing the Scottish Conservatives as the second party in the popular vote. Suddenly, the SNP were no longer a joke; the prospect of independence, not so distant.

My paper for the Parliaments, Politics and People seminar explores the double-edged effects of the North Sea oil discoveries on the politics of Scottish autonomy in the 1970s. It has two main aims. First, the paper seeks to show how the SNP’s electoral upsurge in 1974 – fired by the slogan, ‘It’s Scotland’s Oil!’ – initially induced panic at Westminster and prompted the Labour Government and, indeed, all the main parties to enter into fresh commitments to introduce a national Scottish assembly after years of inaction.

Second, the paper then highlights how concerns relating to North Sea oil – and the designs of a growing Nationalist movement in Scotland – caused the Government to delay implementing devolution after 1974. Doubts over the wisdom of embarking upon far-reaching constitutional reforms intensified as the sheer magnitude of the North Sea discoveries began to dawn upon leading figures at the heart of the British Government.

Drawing on recently released archival materials, the paper devotes considerable attention to the Government decision of late 1975 to delay moving ahead with the assembly. Devolution’s failure in the 1974-1979 Parliament, of course, can be attributed to a number of different factors: the flawed nature of Labour’s scheme; that the proposition had ‘few principled supporters’ in the parties themselves; the vigorous opposition to the legislation mounted in Parliament; and ebbing enthusiasm among voters at large by the time the 1979 referendum rolled around.

But a close analysis of documents for this period shows how the oil issue assumed a key part in the Government’s internal deliberations. And, over the course of 1975, a number of leading Cabinet Ministers and highly influential civil servants drove a pushback against the original plan of the Leader of the House of Commons, Edward (‘Ted’) Short, to hold assembly elections in 1976-1977. Fearing that an assembly would seek to impinge on Britain’s vital oil interests, the Treasury spearheaded the effort within Government to derail the proposals.

RJ

To find out more, Robbie’s full-length paper is available by signing up to his seminar and contacting seminar@histparl.ac.uk. Details of how to join the discussion are available here.

To register for this virtual seminar, please follow this link and click on ‘Book now’. If you cannot attend this session but wish to submit a question to Robbie, please send it to seminar@histparl.ac.uk.

Modern political wisdom has urged caution on Prime Ministers considering calling early elections, in part thanks to memories of 1974. There were two elections in this unusual political year: the first itself a snap election in February by Conservative Prime Minister Ted Heath in response to the energy crisis, three-day-week and industrial action from miners; the second by Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson in a bid to gain a parliamentary majority after winning in February, but only with enough seats to govern as a minority.

Heath’s decision to call the February election was seen as a gamble at a time of crisis. The economy was crippled by high levels of inflation and the oil crisis that followed the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, and the government’s attempts to control rising prices by capping wages were hampered by industrial action called by the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM). This led to a state of emergency and the government heavily restricting energy supplies, including industry operating on a ‘three day week’. Heath hoped that an election victory would give him a stronger hand when dealing with the NUM who were threatening further strikes rather than accepting the government’s pay deal. Heath famously went to the polls asking “who governs Britain?”

According to the former MPs interviewed for our oral history project, Heath’s decision was controversial to both parties. Sir David Madel told us that he was one of many at the party’s backbench 1922 Committee to argue against the election; whereas Laurence Reed instead remembered that the meeting’s overall mood was that Heath “couldn’t back down now”. For Labour, the issue was complicated due to their close ties to the Unions. Many MPs did not fully back the NUM: Alan Lee Williams felt his failure to do so cost him Labour votes in his constituency of Hornchurch; whereas David Stoddart argued that the calling the election was “silly” as the public had sympathy for the miners, and that it gave the unions “a sense of power which a) they didn’t deserve and b) they shouldn’t have”.

Conservative Sir Terrence Higgins argued that Heath in fact called the election too late, by the time he did so the electorate were “basically upset” with the state of the country. Our interviewees certainly remembered a miserable campaign, in bad weather, short broadcast hours and “in the dark” due to restrictions on lighting, such as in this clip from Labour’s Edmund Marshall:

Unfortunately for Heath, early in the campaign a Pay Board official report was published demonstrating that the miners were in fact right to argue that they had been paid less than others in similar sectors. Sir John Hannam remembers the impact this had on the campaign:

Although Heath won the popular vote his gamble had failed: Labour won more seats (if only enough for a minority government). This was a “surprise” to many Conservatives, and to Heath himself, whose last minute efforts to form a government with Jeremy Thorpe’s resurgent Liberal party were described as “half-hearted” by Patrick Jenkin. The minority government meant that everyone in Westminster expected another election quickly. Labour candidates who lost out in February continued to campaign. Frank White, who lost by 300 votes the first time round, let his agent continue to organise “not a campaign” but an active canvassing and door-knocking plan throughout 1974.

When the election came round as expected in October, one crucial factor in the primary battle between Conservatives and Labour was the appeal of minority parties. Labour’s Jim Sillars, who went on to join the SNP, remembered noticing increased support for the nationalists on the doorstep (the SNP went on to win 11 seats – a record for them at the time), and in England the crucial factor for many was the Liberals. They had increased their vote share in February, but fell back in October, causing unpredictability (and sleepless nights!) for a number of candidates, as remembered here by Janet Fookes:

Yet for Helene Hayman, first elected in October having lost out in February, the key was Wilson’s appeal to the electorate:

Wilson did indeed get his majority, but it was a small one of just three. Labour’s Ann Taylor, one of the new MPs elected in October, remarked in her interview that four new Labour MPs elected in the North West would often say “we are the majority”. The result led to a difficult parliament in 1974-9 with the Labour government just managing to stay in power, but saw the end of Edward Heath, who was removed as Conservative leader in 1975 – too late, in the opinion of many of our Conservative interviewees, who argued his leadership was extended by the expected second election and his “stubbornness”. Margaret Thatcher became the new Conservative leader, and ushered in quite a change in government in 1979.

EP

For more on our oral history project, visit our website or you can listen to the recordings in the British Library. Watch this space for more election 2017 themed blogposts…

In 1970 the Conservatives won the general election, and Prime Minister Ted Heath began a major diplomatic effort to join the European Economic Community (EEC) or Common Market. Even after successful negotiations at the European level, passing the legislation would remain difficult for Heath’s government.

Although opposition to joining the EEC could be found in both parties, throughout this period the largest internal divisions were found in the Labour party. Two polarised and outspoken groups emerged: on the party’s left, a group led by figures such as Tony Benn opposed the EEC on economic grounds, believing it would impact on Labour’s plans for a more planned economy; on the party’s right, an enthusiastic pro-European group supported entry both for ideological and economic reasons, led by Roy Jenkins. One of this group, Dick Taverne, even resigned the Labour whip on the issue [see our blog: ‘Defection, by-elections and Europe… in the 1970s’ ].

Ted Heath’s legislation saw Labour MPs joining forces with the Conservatives on both sides of the debate. David Stoddart, MP for Swindon who opposed joining, remembered working directly with the Conservatives to oppose legislation:

David Owen, then a member of the shadow cabinet, remembered the manoeuvres on the pro-EEC side to ensure that the Bill passed:

With this help Heath passed the legislation, despite needing 300 hours of Commons debate to pass the 1972 the European Communities Bill, and the UK joined the EEC.

By the 1974 election therefore, Labour leader Harold Wilson was left with a divided party. He solved this by giving in to the demands of the anti-Europeans in his party and included a promise of a referendum in Labour’s election manifesto. This earnt him praise from some in his party, such as his PPS Frank Judd, who at that time opposed the common market. He remembered that Wilson “understood and respected that point of view,” and was pleased to be able to discuss the issue with Wilson openly whilst keeping his job. The decision to hold a referendum however angered many of the pro-Europeans. David Owen said it was “blatant manoeuvring” and Robert Maclennan, MP for Caithness and Sutherland, it was a party political move he “couldn’t stomach”. Along with Jenkins and these two, a number of MPs resigned from the Shadow Cabinet on the issue.

Yet the Referendum proved a success for the pro-Europeans, when the country voted convincingly to remain part of the EEC. Ray Carter, MP for Birmingham Northfield, remembered the change of opinion in his constituency:

For those had campaigned against the UK staying in, however, the result was a significant disappointment, and did not stop their opposition. In this clip Frank Judd remembers drifting apart from his friend and political ally Tony Benn because of the vote:

Unfortunately for Wilson, the Referendum had failed to resolve the issue within the Labour party. It  became part of larger divisions between left and right in the 1980s, and helped cause one group to leave Labour to form the Social Democratic Party (see our blog: Labour leadership elections through the years). Yet by the 1990s it was the Conservative party who were most at war with themselves over Europe, as we’ll discuss in a post later this week…

EP